4 reading and exposition, and still often were rather cryptically expressed. He was uneasy with theory; I seem to remember a few baffled remarks about his eminent colleague Talcott Parsons. It seems to me simply a matter of the best use of his energies and talents that in the 1960s he wrote little about contemporary China for the general public, and pushed ahead with field development and with the writing of enormously influential textbooks.
Fairbank was indefatigable in his efforts to get the right people in the same room talking to each other; for traditional foreign relations that effort came to its fullest fruition in the conference volume The Chinese World Order.
7 I was the youngest and least secure contributor to that effort. I recall considerable frustration at the unwillingness of quite a number of participants to move beyond their demanding research in multiple languages and histories and compare their case with others that were being represented; on the other hand, Mancall and Schwartz and in other ways Wang Gungwu and Fairbank himself seemed to be moving at a level of generalization that was hard to connect to specific cases, or sliding from century to century in pursuit of a text that would support a point.
Fairbank also was very supportive of research on aspects of Chinese history other than foreign relations. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, he made a real contribution to the intellectual ferment in the field that found China's foreign relations less interesting than aspects of its internal history -a "China-centered turn" that marginalized discussion of foreign relations for several decades. 8 Partly as a result of that turn and that marginalization, themes of China as an "All Under Heaven", an "empire without neighbors" with a "tribute system", continued to haunt our undergraduate lectures and to 5 affect our understanding of contemporary realities for much too long. Criticisms and revisions that attracted only fitful interest and did little to affect discussion of contemporary realities included my study of European tribute embassies, 9 Hevia's cultural studies re-reading of the Macartney embassy, 10 and Johnston's rigorous reexamination of China's traditional grand strategy. 11 Rossabi and his collaborators gave us a rich set of studies of "China among equals" from Tang through Song, but raised few theoretical flags. 12 Smith, Von Glahn, and their collaborators advanced hugely our understanding of a very long transition, but had remarkably little to say about warfare or diplomacy among states. 13 The "new Qing history" has been very much interested in the In this paper I'm going to be repeatedly tempted by more or less metaphoric uses of "asymmetry", and sometimes I'm just going to give in and run with it. There is a profound and worrisome asymmetry between the growth of the quantity and sophistication of our knowledge of China and the still very limited ability of historians, political scientists, and policy analysts to shape public discussion and policy formation. we're trying to build in this conference.
The idea of a "tribute system" may be more alive among East Asian intellectuals than among North American, as they try to confront the puzzles of their relations among There is a good deal of this kind of writing, and it's not easy to get at the core issues in it.
One historian's way of framing them would be that the Westphalian nation-state system imposes a framework of abstract legal equality of nation-states. East Asian intellectuals suspect, or hope, that their own rulers have been less in the thrall of these delusions of equality and thus have been able to focus more realistically and skillfully on the Russia competed in Europe, conquered Central Asia, and built the Trans-Siberian
Railroad. The consequences of these massive asymmetries, and the technological one, were the whole dismal sequence of China's subjection from 1839 to 1902. The Nanjing Republic faced the Japanese threat, Communist resistance, and a new combination of anti-Nanjing politicians and warlords every year, and had very little foreign aid or advice, except for a bit from Germany.
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Asymmetry #6. But Still Too Big to Conquer.
The British and the Americans had shown, as far back as the Open Door Notes, a preference for keeping China intact. The Japanese and perhaps the Russians had other ideas. Manchuria was lost, Xinjiang and Tibet nearly so. But China was too big; Japan might well have conquered a coastal province or two and found enough would-be ministers to staff a subservient administration -they hadn't done too badly in Manchuria -but they were tempted by the vast potential of inland China and wary of the counterattack that surely would be launched by Chinese patriots if they didn't control the whole country. They were defeated, of course, primarily in the Pacific. But they could not stop the local resistance and guerrilla war efforts that were based at a village level that Ming, Qing, or Nanjing Republic never had controlled. is another big worry. China is going to continue to be far from transparent to its own people, or to those of us who try to understand it from outside. If prosperity is the main source of legitimation and popular acceptance of the regime, it can't afford to cut off the web of trans-border guanxi that contribute so much. But are there still worries that those contacts will be subversive and de-stabilizing? It will not be surprising to find among the many voices seeking to shape China's foreign relations some who remind us of past epochs of defensive policy.
China's "peaceful rise" is a great hope for China's people and all the world, as well as a somewhat politically problematic phrase, 39 but we must not expect it to be a straightforward or transparent process. Muddle, contradiction, and cross-currents of guanxi are common features of many periods of flourishing, human, political, and
